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Abstract
We provide formal definitions of degree of blameworthiness
and intention relative to an epistemic state (a probability over
causal models and a utility function on outcomes). These, to-
gether with a definition of actual causality, provide the key
ingredients for moral responsibility judgments. We show that
these definitions give insight into commonsense intuitions in
a variety of puzzling cases from the literature.
1 Introduction
The need for judging moral responsibility arises both in
ethics and in law. In an era of autonomous vehicles and,
more generally, autonomous AI agents that interact with
or on behalf of people, the issue has now become rele-
vant to AI as well. We will clearly need to imbue AI
agents with some means for evaluating moral responsibil-
ity. There is general agreement that a definition of moral
responsibility will require integrating causality, some no-
tion of blameworthiness, and intention (Cushman 2015;
Malle, Guglielmo, and Monroe 2014; Weiner 1995). Previ-
ous work has provided formal accounts of causality
(Halpern 2016); in this paper, we provide formal definitions
of blameworthiness and intention in the same vein.
These notions are notoriously difficult to define carefully.
The well-known trolley problem (Thomson 1985) illustrates
some of them: Suppose that a runaway trolley is headed to-
wards five people who will not be able to get out of the
train’s path in time. If the trolley continues, it will kill all
five of them. An agent ag is near a switchboard, and while
ag cannot stop the trolley, he can pull a lever which will di-
vert the trolley to a side track. Unfortunately, there is a single
man on the side track who will be killed if ag pulls the lever.
Most people agree that it is reasonable for ag to pull
the lever. But now consider a variant of the trolley prob-
lem known as loop (Thomson 1985), where instead of the
side track going off in a different direction altogether, it re-
joins the main track before where the five people are tied up.
Again, there is someone on the side track, but this time ag
knows that hitting the man on the loop will stop the train be-
fore it hits the five people on the main track. How morally
responsible is ag for the death of the man on the side track if
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he pulls the lever? Should the answer be different in the loop
version of the problem? Pulling the lever in the loop condi-
tion is typically judged as less morally permissible than in
the condition without a loop (Mikhail 2007).
The definitions given here take as their starting point the
structural-equations framework used by Halpern and Pearl
(2005) (HP from now on) in defining causality. This frame-
work allows us to model counterfactual statements like “out-
come ϕ would have occurred if agent ag had performed a′
rather than a”. Evaluating such counterfactual statements is
the key to defining intention and blameworthiness, which
are significant components of moral responsibility, just as
it is for defining actual causation. Since we do not assume
that actions lead deterministically to outcomes, we need to
have a probability on the effects of actions. Once we con-
sider causal models augmented with probability, we can to
define ag’s degree of blameworthiness; rather than ag ei-
ther being blameworthy or not for an outcome, he is only
blameworthy to some degree (a number in [0,1]). If we fur-
ther assume that the agent is an expected-utility maximizer,
and augment the framework with a utility function, we can
also define intention. Roughly speaking, an agent who per-
forms action a intends outcome ϕ if he would not have done
a if a had no impact on whether ϕ occurred. (We use the
assumption that the agent is an expected-utility maximizer
to determine what the agent would have done if a had no
impact on ϕ.)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we review the structural-equations framework and the
HP definition of causality. In Section 3, we define degree
of blameworthiness. In Section 4, we define intention. We
discuss computational issues in Section 5. There is a huge
literature on moral responsibility and intention; we discuss
the most relevant related work in Section 6, and conclude in
Section 7.
2 Structural equations and HP causality
The HP approach assumes that the world is described in
terms of variables and their values. Some variables have
a causal influence on others. This influence is modeled by
a set of structural equations. It is conceptually useful to
split the random variables into two sets: the exogenous vari-
ables, whose values are determined by factors outside the
model, and the endogenous variables, whose values are ulti-
mately determined by the exogenous variables. We assume
that there is a special endogenous variable A called the ac-
tion variable; the possible values of A are the actions that
the agent can choose among.1
For example, in the trolley problem, we can assume that
A has two possible values:A = 0 if the lever was not pulled
and A = 1 if it was. Which action is taken is determined
by an exogenous variable. The two possible outcomes in the
trolley problem are described by two other endogenous vari-
ables:O1, which is 1 if the five people on the main track die,
and 0 if they don’t, and O2, which is 1 if the person on the
sidetrack dies, and 0 otherwise.
Having described how actions and outcomes can be rep-
resented as variables we can now define causal models for-
mally. A causal modelM is a pair (S,F), where S is a sig-
nature, that is, a tuple (U ,V ,R), where U is a set of exoge-
nous variables, V is a set of endogenous variables, andR as-
sociates with every variableY ∈ U∪V a nonempty setR(Y )
of possible values for Y (i.e., the set of values over which Y
ranges), and F is a set of modifiable structural equations,
relating the values of the variables. Formally, F associates
with each endogenous variable X ∈ V a function denoted
FX such that FX : (×U∈UR(U))× (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y ))→
R(X). In the trolley problem as modeled above, there are
two equations: O1 = 1 − A (the five people die if the agent
does nothing) and O2 = A (the one person on the side track
dies if the agent pulls the lever).
Following Halpern and Pearl (2005), we restrict attention
here to what are called recursive (or acyclic) models. This is
the special case where there is some total ordering ≺ of the
endogenous variables (the ones in V) such that if X ≺ Y ,
then X is independent of Y , that is, FX(. . . , y, . . .) =
FX(. . . , y
′, . . .) for all y, y′ ∈ R(Y ). If X ≺ Y , then the
value ofX may affect the value of Y , but the value of Y can-
not affect the value of X . It should be clear that if M is an
acyclic causal model, then given a context, that is, a setting
~u for the exogenous variables in U , there is a unique solution
for all the equations. We simply solve for the variables in the
order given by≺. The value of the variable that comes first in
the order, that is, the variableX such that there is no variable
Y such that Y ≺ X , depends only on the exogenous vari-
ables, soX’s value is immediately determined by the values
of the exogenous variables. The values of variables later in
the order can be determined once we have determined the
values of all the variables earlier in the order.
Given a causal modelM = (S,F), a vector ~X of distinct
variables in V , and a vector ~x of values for the variables
in ~X , the causal model M ~X←~x is identical to M , except
that the equation for the variables ~X in F is replaced by
~X = ~x. Intuitively, this is the causal model that results when
the variables in ~X are set to ~x by some external action that
affects only the variables in ~X (and overrides the effects of
1In a more general setting with multiple agents, each perform-
ing actions, we might have a variable Aag for each agent ag. We
might also consider situations over time, where agents perform se-
quences of actions, determined by a strategy, rather than just a sin-
gle action. Allowing this extra level of generality has no impact on
the framework presented here.
the causal equations).
To define causality carefully, it is useful to have a lan-
guage to reason about causality. Given a signature S =
(U ,V ,R), a primitive event is a formula of the formX = x,
forX ∈ V and x ∈ R(X). A causal formula (over S) is one
of the form [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ, where
• ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive events,
• Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in V , and
• yi ∈ R(Yi).
Such a formula is abbreviated as [~Y ← ~y]ϕ. The special
case where k = 0 is abbreviated as ϕ. Intuitively, [Y1 ←
y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ says that ϕ would hold if Yi were set to
yi, for i = 1, . . . , k.
A pair (M,~u) consisting of a causal model and a context
is called a causal setting. A causal formula ψ is true or false
in a causal setting. As in HP, (M,~u) |= ψ if the causal for-
mula ψ is true in the causal setting (M,~u). The |= relation
is defined inductively. (M,~u) |= X = x if the variable X
has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with acyclic
models) solution to the equations inM in context ~u (i.e., the
unique vector of values for the exogenous variables that si-
multaneously satisfies all equations inM with the variables
in U set to ~u). The truth of conjunctions and negations is de-
fined in the standard way. Finally, (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y]ϕ if
(M~Y←~y, ~u) |= ϕ.
The HP definition of causality, like many others, is based
on counterfactuals. The idea is that A is a cause of B if,
had A not occurred (although it did), then B would not
have occurred. But there are many examples showing that
this naive definition will not quite work. For example, sup-
pose that Suzy throws a rock at a bottle, and shatters it.
Billy is waiting in the wings with his rock; if Suzy hadn’t
thrown her rock, then Billy would have thrown his, and
shattered the bottle. We would like to say that Suzy is a
cause of the bottle shattering, but if Suzy hadn’t thrown,
then the bottle would have shattered anyway (since Billy
would have thrown his rock). The definition is intended to
deal with this example (and many others). While the HP
definition has been shown to work well, it could be re-
placed by another definition of causality based on coun-
terfactuals (e.g., (Glymour and Wimberly 2007; Hall 2007;
Halpern and Pearl 2005; Hitchcock 2001; Hitchcock 2007;
Woodward 2003; Wright 1988)) without affecting the re-
maining definitions in the paper.
In the definition, what can be a cause is a conjunction
X1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xk = xk of primitive events (where
X1, . . . , Xk are distinct variables), typically abbreviated as
~X = ~x; what can be caused is an arbitrary Boolean combi-
nation ϕ of primitive events.
Definition 2.1: ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if
the following three conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) and (M,~u) |= ϕ.
AC2. There is a set ~W of variables in V and a setting ~x′ of
the variables in ~X such that if (M,~u) |= ~W = ~w, then
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditionsAC1
and AC2.
If ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) andX = x is a conjunct
of ~X = ~x, thenX = x is part of a cause of ϕ in (M,u).
AC1 just says that ~X = ~x cannot be considered a cause
of ϕ unless both ~X = ~x and ϕ actually happen. AC3 is a
minimality condition that ensures that only those elements
of the conjunction ~X = ~x that are essential are consid-
ered part of a cause; inessential elements are pruned. With-
out AC3, if dropping a lit cigarette is a cause of a fire then
so is dropping the cigarette and sneezing. AC2 is the core
of the definition. If we ignore ~W , it is essentially the stan-
dard counterfactual definition: if ~X is set to some value ~x′
other than its actual value ~x, then ϕ would not have hap-
pened. As we observed, this is not enough to deal with the
case of Billy waiting in the wings. The actual definition al-
lows us to consider what happens if Suzy doesn’t throw,
while keeping fixed the fact that Billy didn’t throw (which
is what happened in the actual world); that is, if the causal
model includes binary variables2 ST (for Suzy throws), BT
(for Billy throws) and BS (for bottle shatters), with the equa-
tion BT = 1− ST (Billy throws exactly if Suzy doesn’t) and
BS = ST ∨ BT (the bottle shatters if either Billy or Suzy
throws), and ~u is the context where Suzy throws, then we
have (M,u) |= [ST ← 0,BT← 0](BS = 0), so AC2 holds.
3 Degree of blameworthiness
We now apply this formal language to study blameworthi-
ness. For agent ag to be morally responsible for an outcome
ϕ, he must be viewed as deserving of blame for ϕ. Among
other things, for ag to be deserving of blame, he must have
placed some likelihood (before acting) on the possibility that
performing a would affect ϕ. If ag did not believe it was
possible for a to affect ϕ, then in general we do not want to
blame ag for ϕ (assuming that ag’s beliefs are reasonable;
see below).
In general, an agent has uncertainty regarding the struc-
tural equations that characterize a causal model and about
the context. This uncertainty is characterized by a probabil-
ity distribution Pr on a set K of causal settings.3 Let K
consist of causal settings (M,~u), and let Pr be a probabil-
ity measure on K. Pr should be thought of as describing the
probability before the action is performed. For ease of ex-
position, we assume that all the models in K have the same
signature (set of endogenous and exogenous variables). We
assume that an agent’s preferences are characterized by a
utility function u on worlds, where a world is a complete
assignment to the endogenous variables. Thus, an epistemic
state for an agent ag consists of a tuple E = (Pr,K,u).
Given an epistemic state for an agent ag, we can deter-
mine the extent to which ag performing action a affected, or
made a difference, to an outcome ϕ (where ϕ can be an ar-
bitrary Boolean combination of primitive events). Formally,
2A variable is binary if it has two possible values.
3Chockler and Halpern (2004) also used such a probability to
define a notion of degree of blame.
we compare a to all other actions a′ that ag could have per-
formed. Let [[ϕ]]K = {(M,~u) ∈ K : (M,~u) |= ϕ}; that
is, [[ϕ]]K consists of all causal settings in K where ϕ is true.
Thus, Pr([[[A = a]ϕ]]K) is the probability that performing
action a results in ϕ. Let
δa,a′,ϕ = max(0,Pr([[[A = a]ϕ)]]K − Pr([[[A = a
′]ϕ]]K)),
so that δa,a′,ϕ measures how much more likely it is that ϕ
will result from performing a than from performing a′ (ex-
cept that if performing a′ is more likely to result in ϕ than
performing a, we just take δa,a′,0 to be 0).
The difference δa,a,ϕ′ is clearly an important component
of measuring the blameworthiness of a relative to a′. But
there is another component, which we can think of as the
cost of doing a. Suppose that Bob could have given up his
life to save Tom. Bob decided to do nothing, so Tom died.
The difference between the probability of Tom dying if Bob
does nothing and if Bob gives up his life is 1 (the maxi-
mum possible), but we do not typically blame Bob for not
giving up his life. What this points out is that blame is also
concerned with the cost of an action. The cost might be cog-
nitive effort, time required to perform the action, emotional
cost, or (as in the example above) death.
We assume that the cost is captured by some outcome
variables. The cost of an action a is then the impact of per-
forming a on these variables. We call the variables that we
consider the action-cost variables. Intuitively, these are vari-
ables that talk about features of an action: Is the action dif-
ficult? Is it dangerous? Does it involve emotional upheaval?
Roughly speaking, the cost of an action is then measured
by the (negative) utility of the change in the values of these
variables due to the action. There are two problems in mak-
ing this precise: first, we do not assign utilities to individual
variables, but to worlds, which are complete settings of vari-
ables. Second, which variables count as action-cost variables
depends in part on the modeler. That said, we do assume that
the action-cost variables satisfy someminimal properties. To
make these properties precise, we need some definitions.
Given a causal setting (M,~u) and endogenous variables
~X in M , let wM,~u denote the unique world determined
by the causal setting (M,~u) and let w
M, ~X←~x,~u denote the
unique world determined by setting ~X to ~x in (M,~u). Thus,
for each endogenous variable V , the value of V in world
w
M, ~X←~x,~u is v iff (M,~u) |= [
~X ← ~x](V = v). Given
an action a and outcome variables ~O, let ~oM,A←a,~u be
the value of ~o when we set A to a in the setting (M,~u);
that is, (M,~u) |= [A ← a]( ~O = ~oM,A←a,~u). Thus,
w
M,~O←~oM,A←a,~u,~u
is the world that results when ~O is set
to the value that it would have if action a is performed in
causal setting (M,~u). To simplify the notation, we omit the
M and ~u in the subscript of ~o (since they already appear in
the subscript ofw), and just writew
M,~O←~oA←a,~u
. The world
w
M,~O←~oA←a,~u
isolates the effects of a on the variables in ~O.
With this background, we can state the properties that we
expect the set ~Oc of action-cost variables to have:
• for all causal settings (M,~u) and all actions a, we have
u(wM,~u) ≥ u(wM,~Oc←~oA←a,~u)
(so performing a is actually costly, as far as the variables
in ~Oc go);
• for all causal settings (M,~u), all actions a, and all subsets
~O′ of ~Oc, we have
u(w
M,~Oc←~oA←a,~u
) ≤ u(w
M,~O′←~o′
A←a
,~u
)
(so all variables in ~Oc are costly—by not considering
some of them, the cost is lowered).
Definition 3.1: The (expected) cost of action a (with respect
to ~Oc), denoted c(a), is
∑
(M,~u)∈K Pr(M,~u)(u(wM,~u −
u(w
M,~Oc←~oA←a,~u
)).
If we think of ϕ as a bad outcome of performing a, then
the blameworthiness of a for ϕ relative to a′ is a combina-
tion of the likelihood to which the outcome could have been
improved by performing a′ and cost of a relative to the cost
of a′. Thus, if c(a) = c(a′), the blameworthiness of a for
ϕ relative to a′ is just δa,a′,ϕ. But if performing a
′ is quite
costly relative to performing a, this should lead to a decrease
in blameworthiness. How much of a decrease is somewhat
subjective. To capture this, choose N > maxa′ c(a
′) (in
general, we expect N to be situation-dependent). The size
of N is a measure of how important we judge cost to be in
determining blameworthiness; the larger N is, the less we
weight the cost.
Definition 3.2: The degree of blameworthiness of a for ϕ
relative to a′ (given c and N ), denoted dbN (a, a
′, ϕ), is
δa,a′,ϕ
N−max(c(a′)−c(a),0)
N
. The degree of blameworthiness
of a for ϕ, denoted dbN (a, ϕ) ismaxa′ dbN (a, a
′, ϕ).
Intuitively, we view the cost as a mitigating factor when
computing the degree of blameworthiness of a for ϕ. We
can think of
N−max(c(a′)−c(a),0)
N
as the mitigation fac-
tor. No mitigation is needed when comparing a to a′ if
the cost of a is greater than that of a′. And, indeed,
because of the max(c(a) − c(a′), 0) term, if c(a) ≥
c(a′) then the mitigation factor is 1, and db(a, a′, ϕ) =
δa,a′,ϕ. In general,
N+max(c(a)−c(a′),0)
N
≤ 1. Moreover,
limN→∞ dbN(a, a
′, ϕ) = δa,act′,ϕ. Thus, for large values
of N , we essentially ignore the costliness of the act. On the
other hand, ifN and c(a′) are both close tomaxa′′ c(a
′′) and
c(a) = 0, then dbN (a, a
′, ϕ) is close to 0. Thus, in the exam-
ple with Bob and Tom above, if we take costs seriously, then
we would not find Bob particularly blameworthy for Tom’s
death if the only way to save Tom is for Bob to give up his
own life.
The need to consider alternatives when determining
blameworthiness is certainly not new, as can be seen from
the essays in (Widerker and McKenna 2006).4 What seems
4In the philosophy literature, part of the discussion of alterna-
tives is bound up with issues of determinism and free will (if the
world is deterministic and agents do not have free will, then they
never could have done otherwise). In this paper, we ignore this is-
sue, and implicitly assume that agents always have choices.
to be new here is the emphasis on blameworthiness with re-
spect an outcome and taking cost into account. The follow-
ing example shows the impact of the former point.
Example 3.3: Suppose that agent ag is faced with the fol-
lowing dilemma: if ag doesn’t pull the lever, six anonymous
people die; if ag does pull the lever, the first five people will
still die, but the sixth will be killed with only probability
0.2. If ag does not pull the lever, ag is not blameworthy for
the five deaths (no matter what he did, the five people would
have died), but has some degree of blameworthiness for the
sixth. The point here is that just the existence of a better ac-
tion a′ is not enough. To affect ag’s blameworthiness for
outcome ϕ, action a′ must be better in a way that affects ϕ.
Defining the degree of blameworthiness of an action for a
particular outcome, as done here, seems to be consistent with
the legal view. A prosecutor considering what to charge a
defendant with is typically considering which outcomes that
defendant is blameworthy for.
Blameworthiness is defined relative to a probability dis-
tribution. We do not necessarily want to use the agent’s sub-
jective probability. For example, suppose that the agent had
several bottles of beer, goes for a drive, and runs over a
pedestrian. The agent may well have believed that the prob-
ability that his driving would cause an accident was low, but
we clearly don’t want to use his subjective probability that
he will cause an accident in determining blameworthiness.
Similarly, suppose that a doctor honestly believes that a cer-
tain medication will have no harmful side effects for a pa-
tient. One of his patients who had a heart condition takes the
medication and dies as a result. If the literature distributed to
the doctor included specific warning about dire side-effects
for patients with this heart condition but the doctor was lazy
and didn’t read it, again, it does not seem reasonable to use
the doctor’s probability distribution. Rather, we want to use
the probability distribution that he should have had, had he
read the relevant literature. Our definition allows us to plug
in whatever probability distribution we consider most appro-
priate.
In using the term “blameworthiness”, we have implicitly
been thinking of ϕ as a bad outcome. If ϕ is a good outcome,
it seems more reasonable to use the term “praiseworthiness”.
However, defining praiseworthiness raises some significant
new issues. We mention a few of them here:
• Suppose that all actions are costless, Bob does nothing
and, as a result, Tom lives. Bob could have shot Tom, so
according to the definition Bob’s degree of blameworthi-
ness for Tom living is 1. Since living is a good outcome,
we may want to talk about praiseworthiness rather than
blameworthiness, but it still seems strange to praise Tom
for doing the obvious thing. This suggests that for praise-
worthiness, we should compare the action to the “stan-
dard” or “expected” thing to do. To deal with this, we
assume that there is a default action a0, which we can
typically think of as “doing nothing” (as in the example
above), but does not have to be. Similarly, we typically
assume that the default action has low cost, but we do
not require this. The praiseworthiness of an act is typi-
cally compared just to the default action, rather than to
all actions. Thus, we consider just δa,a0,ϕ, not δa,a′,ϕ for
arbitrary a′.
• It does not seem that there should be a lessening of
praise if the cost of a is even lower than that of the
default (although that is unlikely in practice). On the
other hand, it seems that there should be an increase in
praise the more costly a is. For example, we view an
action as particularly praiseworthy if someone is risk-
ing his life to perform it. This suggests that the degree
of praiseworthiness of a should be δa,a0,ϕ if c(a) ≤
c(a0), and δa,a0,ϕ
M−c(a0)+c(a)
M
if c(a) > c(a0). But
this has the problem that the degree of praiseworthiness
might be greater than 1. To deal with this, we take the
degree of praiseworthiness for ϕ to be δa,a0,ϕ + (1 −
δa,a0,ϕ)
M−c(a0)+c(a)
M
if c(a) > c(a0). (Some other func-
tion that increases to 1 the larger c(a) is relative to c(a0)
would also work.)
But there is an additional subtlety. If the agent put a lot
of effort into a (i.e., c(a) − c(a0) is large) because his
main focus was some other outcome ϕ′ 6= ϕ, and there
is another action a′ that would achieve ϕ at much lower
cost, then it seems unreasonable to give the agent quite so
much praise for his efforts in achieving ϕ. We might want
to consider the effort required by the least effortful action
that achieves ϕ.
• We typically do not praise someone for an outcome that
was not intended (although we might well find someone
blameworthy for an unintended outcome).
Putting all these considerations together, we have the fol-
lowing definition of praiseworthiness.
Definition 3.4 : The degree of praiseworthiness of a
(relative to M ) for ϕ, denoted pwM (a, ϕ), is 0 if
ϕ was not an intended outcome of a (as defined in
the next section), and is is δa,a0,ϕ + max(0, (1 −
δa,a0,ϕ)min{a′:δ(a′,a0,ϕ)≥δ(a,a0,ϕ)}
M−c(a0)+c(a′)
M
) if ϕ is
intended.
This definition considers only acts a′ that are at least as ef-
fective at achieving ϕ as a (as measured by δa′,a0,ϕ). We
could also consider the cost of acts that are almost as effec-
tive at achieving ϕ as a. We hope to do some experiments to
see how people actually assign degrees of praiseworthiness
in such circumstances.
The focus of these definitions has been on the blame (or
praise) due to a single individual. Things get more compli-
cated once we consider groups. Consider how these defini-
tions play out in the context of the well-known Tragedy of
the Commons (Hardin 1968), where there are many agents,
each of which can perform an action (like fishing, or letting
his sheep graze on the commons) which increases his indi-
vidual utility, but if all agents perform the action, they all
ultimately suffer (fish stocks are depleted; the commons is
overgrazed).
Example 3.5: Consider a collective of fishermen. Suppose
that if more than a couple of agents fail to limit their fishing,
the fish stocks will collapse and there will be no fishing al-
lowed the following year. The fisherman in fact all do fish,
so the fish stocks collapse.
Each agent is clearly part of the cause of the outcome. To
determine a single agent’s degree of blameworthiness, we
must consider that agent’s uncertainty about how many of
the other fisherman will limit their fishing. If the agent be-
lieves (perhaps justifiably) that, with high probability, very
few of themwill limit their fishing, then his blameworthiness
will be quite low. As we would expect, under minimal as-
sumptions about the probability measure Pr, the more fish-
erman there are and the larger the gap between the expected
number of fish taken and the number that will result in over-
fishing limitations, the lower the degree of blameworthiness.
Moreover, a fisherman who catches less fish has less blame-
worthiness. In all these cases, it is less likely that changing
his action will lead to a change in outcome.
The way that blameworthiness is assigned to an individ-
ual fisherman in Example 3.5 essentially takes the actions
of all the other fisherman as given. But it is somewhat dis-
concerting that if each of N fisherman justifiably believed
that all the other fisherman would overfish, then each might
have degree of blameworthiness significantly less than the
1/N that we might intuitively give them if they all caught
roughly the same number of fish.
One way to deal with this is to consider the degree of
blame we would assign to all the fisherman, viewed as a
collective (i.e., as a single agent). The collective can clearly
perform a different action that would lead to the desired out-
come. Thus, viewed as a collective, the fishermen have de-
gree of blameworthiness close to 1 (since they could per-
formed a joint action that resulted in no further fishing, and
they could have performed an action that would have guar-
anteed that there would be fishing in the future).
How should we allocate this “group moral blameworthi-
ness” to the individual agents? We believe that Chockler and
Halpern’s (2004) notion of responsibility and blame can be
helpful in this regard, because they are intended to mea-
sure how responsibility and blame are diffused in a group.
It seems that when ascribing moral responsibility in group
settings, people consider both an agent as an individual and
as a member of a group. Further research is needed to clarify
this issue.
4 Intention
The definition of degree of blameworthiness does not take
intention into account. In the trolley problem, an agent who
pulls the lever so that only one person dies is fully blame-
worthy for that death. However, it is clear that the agent’s
intent was to save five people, not kill one; the death was an
unintended side-effect. Usually, agents are not held respon-
sible for accidents and the moral permissibility of an action
does not take into account unintended side-effects.
Two types of intention have been considered in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., (Cohen and Levesque 1990)): (1) whether
agent ag intended to perform action a (perhaps it was an ac-
cident) and (2) did ag (when performing a) intend outcome
ϕ (perhaps ϕ was an unintended side-effect of a, which was
actually performed to bring about outcome o′). Intuitively,
an agent intended to perform a (i.e., a was not accidental) if
his expected utility from a is at least as high as his expected
utility from other actions. The following definition formal-
izes this intuition.
Definition 4.1: Action a was intended in (M,~u) given epis-
temic state E = (Pr,K,u) if (M,~u) |= A = a (a was
actually performed in causal setting (M,~u)), |R(A)| ≥ 2 (a
is not the only possible action), and for all a′ ∈ R(A),
∑
(M,~u)∈K
Pr(M,~u)(u(wM,A←a,~u)− u(wM,A←a′,~u)) ≥ 0.
The assumption that |R(A)| ≥ 2 captures the intuition
that we do not say that a was intended if a was the only
action that the agent could perform. We would not say that
someonewho is an epileptic intended to have a seizure, since
they could not have done otherwise. What about someone
who performed an action because there was a gun held to
his head? In this case, it depends on how we model the set
A of possible actions. If we take the only feasible action
to be the act a that was performed (so we view the agent
as having no real choice in the matter), then the action was
not intended. But if we allow for the possibility of the agent
choosing whether or not to sacrifice his life, then we would
view whatever was imposed as intended.
Requiring that |R(A)| ≥ 2 also lets us deal with some
standard examples in the philosophy literature. For exam-
ple, Davidson (1980) considers a climber who knows that
he can save himself from plummeting to his death by letting
go of a rope connecting him to a companion who has lost
his footing, but the thought of the contemplated action so
upsets him that he lets go accidentally (and hence uninten-
tionally). We would argue that at the point that the climber
let go of the rope, he had no alternative choices, so the action
was not intended, even if, had he not gotten upset, he would
have performed the same action at the same time intention-
ally (because he would then have had other options).
The intuition for the agent intending outcome ~O = ~o is
that, had a been unable to affect ~O, ag would not have per-
formed a. But this is not quite right for several reasons, as
the following examples show.
Example 4.2: Suppose that a patient has malignant lung can-
cer. The only thing that the doctor believes that he can do to
save the patient is to remove part of the lung. But this opera-
tion is dangerous and may lead to the patient’s death. In fact,
the patient does die. Certainly the doctor’s operation is the
cause of death, and the doctor intended to perform the op-
eration. However, if the variable O represents the possible
outcomes of the operation, with O = 0 denoting that the pa-
tient dies andO = 1 denoting that the patient is cured, while
the doctor intended to affect the variable O, he certainly did
not intend the actual outcome O = 0.
Example 4.3: Suppose that Louis plants a bomb at a table
where his cousin Rufus, who is standing in the way of him
getting an inheritance, is going to have lunch with Sibella.
Louis get 100 units of utility if Rufus dies, 0 if he doesn’t
die, and −200 units if he goes to jail. His total utility is the
sum of the utilities of the relevant outcomes (so, for exam-
ple, −100 if Rufus dies and he goes to jail). He would not
have planted the bomb if doing so would not have affected
whether Rufus dies. On the other hand, Louis would still
have planted the bomb even if doing so had no impact on
Sibella. Thus, we can conclude that Louis intended to kill
Rufus but did not intend to kill Sibella.
Now suppose that Louis has a different utility function,
and prefers that both Rufus and Sibella die. Specifically,
Louis get 50 units of utility if Louis dies and 50 units of
utility if Sibella dies. Again, he gets −200 if he goes to jail,
and his total utility is the sum of the utilities of the rele-
vant outcomes.With these utilities, intuitively, Louis intends
both Rufus and Sibella to die. Even if he knew that planting
the bomb had no impact on whether Rufus lives (perhaps
because Rufus will die of a heart attack, or because Rufus
is wearing a bomb-proof vest), Louis would still plant the
bomb (since he would get significant utility from Sibella dy-
ing). Similarly, he would plant the bomb even if it had no
impact on Sibella. Thus, according to the naive definition,
Louis did not intend to kill either Rufus or Sibella.
Our definition will deal with both of these problems. We
actually give our definition of intent in two steps. First, we
define what it means for agent ag to intend to affect the vari-
ables in ~O by performing action a.
To understand the way we formalize this intuition bet-
ter, suppose first that a is deterministic. Then wM,A←a,~u
is the world that results when action a is performed in the
causal setting (M,~u) andw
M,(A←a′, ~O←~oA←a),~u
is the world
that results when act a′ is performed, except that the vari-
ables in ~O are set to the values that they would have had
if a were performed rather than a′. If u(wM,A←a,~u) <
u(w
M,(A←a′, ~O←~oA←a),~u
), that means that if the variables in
~O are fixed to have the values they would have if a were per-
formed, then the agent would prefer to do a′ rather than a.
Similarly, u(w
M,( ~O←~oA←a),~u
) > u(w
M,( ~O←~oA←a′),~u
) says
that the agent prefers how a affects the variables in ~O to how
a′ affects these variables. Intuitively, it will be these two con-
ditions that suggest that the agent intends to affect the values
of the variables in ~O by performing a; once their values are
set, the agent would prefer a′ to a.
The actual definition of the agent intending to affect the
variables in ~O is slightly more complicated than this in sev-
eral respects. First, if the outcome of a is probabilistic, we
need to consider each of the possible outcomes of perform-
ing a and weight them by their probability of occurrence. To
do this, for each causal setting (M,~u) that the agent con-
siders possible, we consider the effect of performing a in
(M,~u) and weight it by the probability that the agent as-
signs to (M,~u). Second, we must deal with the situation
discussed in Example 4.3 where Louis intends both Rufus
and Sibella to die. Let DR and DS be variables describing
whether Rufus and Sibella, respectively, die. While Louis
certainly intends to affect DR, he will not plant the bomb
only if both Rufus and Sibella die without the bomb (i.e.,
only if both DR and DS are set to 0). Thus, to show that
the agent intends to affect the variable DR, we must con-
sider a superset ofDR (namely, {DR, DS}). Third, we need
a minimality condition. If Louis intended to kill only Rufus,
and Sibella dying was an unfortunate byproduct, we do not
want to say that he intended to affect {DR, DS}, although he
would not have planted the bomb if both DR and DS were
set to 0. There is a final subtlety: when considering whether
ag intended to perform a, what alternative actions should
we compare a to? The obvious answer is “all other actions
in A”. Indeed, this is exactly what was done by Kleiman-
Weiner et al. (2016) (who use an approach otherwise similar
in spirit to the one proposed here, but based on influence di-
agrams rather than causal models). We instead generalize to
allow a reference set REF (a) of actions that does not in-
clude a but, as the notation suggests, can depend on a, and
compare a only to actions in REF (a). As we shall see, we
need this generalization to avoid some problems.We discuss
REF (a) in more detail below, after giving the definition.
Definition 4.4: An agent ag intends to affect ~O by doing
action a given epistemic state E = (Pr,K,u) and reference
set REF (a) ⊂ R(A) if and only if there exists a superset
~O′ of ~O such that (a)
∑
(M,~u)∈K Pr(M,~u)u(wM,A←a,~u) ≤
max
a′∈REF(a)
∑
(M,~u)∈K
Pr(M,~u)u(w
M,(A←a′, ~O′←~o′
A←a
),~u),
and (b) ~O′ is minimal; that is, for all strict subsets ~O∗
of ~O′, we have
∑
(M,~u)∈K Pr(M,~u)u(wM,A←a,~u) >
max
a′∈REF(a)
∑
(M,~u)∈K
Pr(M,~u)u(w
M,(A←a′, ~O∗←~o′
A←a
),~u).
Part (a) says that if the variables in ~O′ were given the
value they would get if a were performed, then some act
a′ ∈ REF (a) becomes at least as good as a. Part (b) says
that ~O′ is the minimal set of outcomes with this property. In
a nutshell, ~O′ is the minimal set of outcomes that ag is trying
to affect by performing a. Once they have their desired val-
ues, ag has no further motivation to perform a; some other
action is at least as good.
What should REF (a) be? Since a /∈ REF (a), if there
are only two actions in A, then REF (a) must consist of the
other act. A natural generalization is to takeREF (a) = A−
{a}. The following example shows why this will not always
work.
Example 4.5: Suppose that Daniel is a philanthropist who is
choosing a program to support. He wants to choose among
programs that support schools and health clinics and he cares
about schools and health clinics equally. If he chooses pro-
gram 1 he will support 5 schools and 4 clinics. If he chooses
program 2 he will support 2 schools and 5 clinics. Assume
he gets 1 unit of utility for each school or clinic supported.
The total utility of a program is the sum of the utility he gets
for the schools and clinics minus 1 for the overhead of both
programs. We can think of this overhead as the cost of im-
plementing a program versus not implementing any of the
programs. By default he can also do nothing which has util-
ity 0 since it avoids any overhead and doesn’t support any
schools or clinics.
Clearly his overall utility is maximized by choosing pro-
gram 1. Intuitively, by doing so, he intends to affect both the
schools and clinics. Indeed, if he could support 5 schools and
4 clinics without the overhead of implementing a program,
he would do that. However, if we consider all alternatives,
then the minimality condition fails. If he could support 5
schools he would switch to program 2, but if he could sup-
port 4 clinics he would still choose program 1. This gives
the problematic result that Daniel intends to support only
schools. The problem disappears if we take the reference set
to consist of just the default action: doing nothing. Then we
get the desired result that Daniel intends to both support the
5 schools and the 4 clinics.
It might seem that by allowing REF (a) to be a param-
eter of the definition we have allowed too much flexibility,
leaving room for rather ad hoc choices. There are principled
reasons for restricting REF (a) and not taking it to be all
acts other than a in general. For one thing, the set of acts
can be large, so there are computational reasons to consider
fewer acts. If there is a natural default action (as in Exam-
ple 4.5), this is often a natural choice for REF (a): people
often just compare what they are doing to doing nothing (or
to doing what everyone expects them to do, if that is the
default). However, we cannot take REF (a) to be just the
default action if a is itself the default action (since then the
first part of Definition 4.4 would not hold for any set ~O of
outcomes). The choice of reference set can also be influ-
enced by normality considerations. As the following exam-
ple shows, we may want REF (a) to include what society
views as the “moral” choice(s) in addition to the default ac-
tion.
Example 4.6: Suppose that agent ag has a choice of saving
both Tom and Jim, saving George, or doing nothing. Saving
Tom and Jim will result in ag’s nice new shoes being ru-
ined. Saving either one or two people also incurs some mi-
nor overhead costs (it takes some time, and perhaps ag will
have to deal with some officials). Agent ag ascribes utility
10 to each person saved, utility −10.5 to ruining his shoes,
and utility −1 to the overhead of saving someone. The util-
ity of an act is just the sum of the utilities of the relevant
outcomes. Thus, saving Tom and Jim has utility 8.5, sav-
ing George has utility 9, and doing nothing has utility 0. We
would like to say that by saving George, ag intends to af-
fect both the state of his shoes and whether George lives or
dies. If we take REF (a) to consist only of the default action
(doing nothing), then we get that ag intends to save George,
but not that he intends to avoid ruining the shoes. On the
other hand, if we include the “moral” action of saving Jim
and Tom inREF (a), then we get, as desired, that ag intends
both to save George and to avoid ruining the shoes (whether
or not the default action is included).
The next example shows a further advantage of being able
to choose the reference set.
Example 4.7: Suppose that ag has a choice of two jobs.
With the first (action a1), he will earn $1,000 and impress
his girlfriend, but not make his parents happy; with the sec-
ond (a2), he will earn $1,000 and make his parents happy,
but not impress his girlfriend; a3 correspond to not taking a
job at all, which will earn nothing, not impress his girlfriend,
and not make his parents happy. He gets utility 5 for earn-
ing $1,000, 3 for impressing his girlfriend, and 2 for making
his parents happy; there is also overhead of −1 in working.
Not surprisingly, he does a1. If we take the default to be a3,
and thus take REF (a1) = {a3}, then he intends both to
earn $1,000 and impress his girlfriend. If we take the default
to be a2 (intuitively, this was the job ag was expected to
take), and take REF (a1) = {a2}, then he intended only to
impress his girlfriend. Intuitively, in the latter case, we are
viewing earning $1,000 as a given, so we do not take it to be
something that the agent intends.
More generally, we expect it to often be the case that the
reference set consists of the actions appropriate from various
viewpoints. The default action is typically the action of least
cost, so appropriate if one wants to minimize costs. The so-
cially optimal action is arguably appropriate from the view-
point of society. If other viewpoints seem reasonable, this
might suggest yet other actions that could be included in the
reference set. Of course, it may not alwaysbe obvious what
the appropriate action is from a particular viewpoint. As in
many other problems involving causality and reponsibility,
this means that intentions are, in general, model dependent,
and there maybe disagreement about the “right” model.
Given the variables that the agent intends to affect, we can
determine the outcomes that the agent intends.
Definition 4.8: Agent ag intends to bring about ~O = ~o
in (M,~u) by doing action a given epistemic state
E = (Pr,K,u) and reference set REF (a) if and only
if (a) ag intended to affect ~O by doing action a in epistemic
state E given REF (a), (b) there exists a setting (M ′, ~u′)
such that Pr(M ′, ~u′) > 0 and (M ′, ~u′) |= [A← a]( ~O = ~o),
(c) for all values ~o∗ of ~O such that there is a setting (M ′, ~u′)
with Pr(M ′, ~u′) > 0 and (M ′, ~u′) |= [A← a]( ~O = ~o∗),
we have
∑
(M,~u)∈K Pr(M,~u)u(wM,~O←~o,~u) ≥∑
(M,~u)∈K Pr(M,~u)u(wM,~O←~o∗,~u).
Part (b) of this definition says that ag considers ~O = ~o a
possible outcome of performing a (even if it doesn’t happen
in the actual situation (M,~u)). Part (c) says that, among all
possible values of ~O that ag considers possible, ~o gives the
highest expected utility.
This definition seems to capture significant aspects of nat-
ural language usage of the word “intends”, at least if a is
deterministic or close to deterministic. But if a is probabilis-
tic, then we often use the word “hopes” rather than intends.
It seems strange to say that ag intends to win $5,000,000
when he buys a lottery ticket (if $5,000,000 is the highest
payoff); it seems more reasonable to say that he hopes to
win $5,000,000. Similarly, if a doctor performs an operation
on a patient who has cancer that he believes has only a 30%
chance of complete remission, it seems strange to say that
he “intends” to cure the patient, although he certainly hopes
to cure the patient by performing the operation. In addition,
once we think in terms of “hopes” rather than “intends”, it
may make sense to consider not just the best outcome, but
all reasonably good outcomes. For example, the agent who
buys a lottery ticket might be happy to win any prize that
gives over $10,000, and the doctor might also be happy if
the patient gets a remission for 10 years.
Example 4.9: In the basic trolley scenario, under minimal
assumptions (namely, that the agent’s utility function is such
that fewer deaths are better), an agent who pulls the lever
does not intend to kill the person on the side track; he would
have pulled the lever even if the person did not die (since the
train would still have gone on the side track, and the 5 deaths
would have been avoided). The situation is a bit more sub-
tle in the case of the loop problem. What the agent intends
depends in part on how we model the problem. One reason-
able way is to have a binary variable TH for “trolley hits the
person on the side track”, a binary variable D for “person
on side track dies”, and a binary variable TS for “train stops
before killing the 5 people on the main track”. We have the
obvious equations: D = TH and TS = TH; as a result of
the train hitting the person on the side track, he dies and the
train stops before hitting the 5 people on the main track. It
follows from Definition 4.4 that the agent ag who pulled the
lever intended to hit the person on the side track, but did not
intend to kill him.
Note that if we do not separate the train hitting the per-
son on the track from the death of that person, but rather just
have the variables D and TS, with the equation TS = D,
then ag did intend the person’s death. Given that the death
causes the train to stop, not pulling the lever is at least as
good as pulling the lever (either way, the train does not hit
the five people), and slightly better if there is a small cost
to pulling the lever. Intuitively, the latter choice of model
is appropriate if the person cannot even imagine hitting the
person without killing him. This shows that intention (just
like causality and blameworthiness) is very much model de-
pendent, and, among other things, depends on the choice of
variables.
The issues that arise in choosing the variables in a causal
model arise more generally in causal chains where both
means and ends are desired.
Example 4.10 : Consider a student ag that can decide
whether or not to study (A = s or A = ns) for an exam.
If ag studies she will receive good grades (G) and get a job
(J) otherwise she will receive poor grades and not get a job.
Assume the cost of studying is −1 to ag but the value of
good grades is 10 and the value of a job is also 10. Thus,
for ag, either the grades or job would have been sufficiently
motivating to study. Intuitively, we would like to say that
ag intends to both get good grades and get a job. However,
according to our definition of intention, in this model, the
agent does not intend to get a job. Setting J to 1 is by itself
not enough for the agent not to study, since he also wants to
get good grades. While setting both J and G to 1 is enough
for the agent not to study, this is not a minimal intervention;
setting G to 1 is enough to get the agent not to study (since
setting G to 1 causes J to be 1). Like the loop track case,
if we augment the model to include a variable A represent-
ing the sense of accomplishment that ag feels as a result of
getting good grades, with the obvious equationA = G, then
in the resulting model, ag intends to both get good grades
and get a job (since setting A and J to 1 suffices to get the
agent not to study, and this is a minimal set). The variable
A plays the same role here as the variable D in the model
of trolley problem with the loop; it enables us to separate
the means—getting good grades—from the end—the sense
of accomplishment. Once we use different variables for the
means and ends in this way, we can examine more carefully
what the agent truly intended.5
If we change the trolley problem so that the person on the
side track is planning on blowing up 10 other people, then
according to our definition, the agent who pulls the lever
intends to both kill the person on the side track and to save
the five people on the main track. Our definition delivers the
desired result here.
The following example, which is due to Chisholm (1966)
and discussed at length by Searle (1969), has been difficult
for other notions of intention to deal with, but is not a prob-
lem for the definition above.
Example 4.11: Louis wants to kill his uncle and has a plan
for doing so. On the way to his uncle’s house in order to
carry out his plan, he gets so agitated due to thinking about
the plan that he loses control of his car, running over a pedes-
trian, who turns out to be his uncle. Although Louis wants
to kill his uncle, we would not want to say that Louis in-
tended to kill his uncle by running over the pedestrian, nor
that he intended to run over the pedestrian at all. Given rea-
sonable assumptions about Louis’s beliefs (specifically, that
the pedestrian was extremely unlikely to be his uncle), he
clearly would have preferred not to run over the pedestrian
than to run him over, so the action of running over the pedes-
trian was not intended according to Definition 4.1. Thus, he
did not intend his uncle to die when he ran over over the
pedestrian.
Experiments performed by Kleiman-Weiner et al. (2015)
lend support to the fact that people are using utility consider-
ations in judging degree of moral permissibility. For exam-
ple, the more people there are on the main track, the greater
the number of people who judge it morally permissible to
pull the lever. Presumably, pulling the lever has greater util-
ity if it saves more people. In addition, in a situation where
there is only one person on the main track, but it is ag’s
brother, it is considered more morally permissible to pull the
lever than if the one person on the main track is an anony-
mous individual. Presumably, ag gets higher utility by sav-
ing his brother than by saving an anonymous person; peo-
ple considering moral responsibility take that into account.
Kleiman-Weiner et al. (2016) provide a theory of moral per-
missibility which generalizes the doctrine of double effect6
5We thank Sander Beckers for suggesting this example and
pointing out in the original model, the agent does not intend to
get a job.
6The doctrine of double effect is a well studied moral rules that
says that an action is permissible if the agent performing that ac-
tion intends the good effects and does not intend the bad effects as
either an end or as a means to an end. The good effects must also
outweigh the negative unintended side-effects.
and integrates both utility maximization and intention using
a noisy-or model.
The three components that make up moral responsibility
involve a mix of retrospective and prospective judgments.
Causality is purely retrospective; it is based on what hap-
pened. Blameworthiness as we have defined it is purely
prospective; it is based on beliefs that hold before the ac-
tion was performed. The notion of “a was intended” given
in Definition 4.1 is retrospective; we don’t say that a was
(un)intended unless a was actually performed. On the other
hand, the notion of “intending to bring about ~O = ~o by
doing a” is prospective. When an autonomous agent is ap-
plying these definitions, we would expect the focus to be
on the prospective parts, especially blameworthiness. Inter-
estingly, Cushman (2008) shows that people distinguish be-
tween how “wrong” an action is (which depends largely on
the agent’s mental state, and what the agent believed) and
whether an agent should be punishment for the action (which
depends on causality—what actually happened—as well as
the agent’s epistemic state). Both notions depend on inten-
tion. The point is that whether an act is right or wrong is
essentially prospective, while whether someone should be
punished has both prospective and retrospective features.
Although we use words like “blame” both in the context
of right/wrong and in the context of “deserving of punish-
ment”, Cushman’s work shows that people are quite sen-
sitive to the prospective/retrospective distinction. Thus, it
seems useful to have formal notions that are also sensitive
to this distinction.
We conclude this section by considering perhaps the best-
studied example in the moral responsibility literature, due to
Frankfurt (1969) (see, e.g., (Widerker and McKenna 2006)
for more discussion of this example).
Example 4.12 : Suppose that Black wants Jones to kill
Smith, and is prepared to go to considerable lengths to en-
sure this. So Black waits to see if Jones poisons Smith’s
drink. If Jones does not do this, Smith would give Jones
a loaded gun and persuade him to kill Smith anyway. We
are supposed to assume here that Smith can tell if Jones put
a poison in Smith’s drink and can persuade Jones to shoot
Smith. However, Jones is uncertain about Black’s intent and
his persuasive powers. (Indeed, in many variants of the story,
Jones does not even know that Black is present.) In any case,
Jones does in fact poison Smith, and consequently Smith
dies.
The problem for most theories of moral responsibility
here is that, although Jones freely chose to poison Smith,
there is a sense in which he could not have prevented him-
self from being a cause of Smith’s death, because had he not
poisoned Smith, Black would have persuaded Jones to shoot
Smith.
Despite Black, Jones’ action of poisoning is a cause of
Smith’s death according to Definition 2.1. If we consider
the obvious causal model M with with an exogenous vari-
able JP (Jones poisons Smith) and endogenous variables BP
(Black persuades Jones to shoot Smith), JS (Jones shoots
Smith), and SD (Smith dies), with the obvious equations
(SD = JS ∨ JP, JS = BP, BP = ¬JP, and u is a context
where JP = 1, then
(M,u) |= JP = 1 ∧ BP = 0 ∧ JS = 0 ∧ SD = 1.
Since (M,u) |= [JP ← 0,BP ← 0](SD = 0), it follows
that JP = 1 is a cause of Smith’s death. Moreover, if Jones
in fact poisons Smith, it seems reasonable to assume that his
utility function is such that he intended the poisoning and its
outcome. Jones has a positive degree of blameworthiness for
Smith’s death if we assume thatPr assigns positive probabil-
ity to a causal model where Jones poisons Smith and Black
would not be able to persuade Jones to shoot Smith if Jones
didn’t poison him, either because he didn’t bother trying or
his persuasive powers were insufficient. Interestingly, if Pr
assigns probability 1 to Black wanting to and being able to
persuade Jones, then Jones will have degree of blamewor-
thiness 0 for Smith’s death, although he intends to kill him.
The lower the probability of Black wanting to and being able
to persuade Jones, the higher Jones’ blameworthiness, and
hence the higher the Jones’ moral responsibility.
This seems to us reasonable. Consider the following more
realistic Frankfurt-style problem. Jones votes for Smith in an
election. The army wants Smith to win, and if he does not
win, they will step in and declare him the victor. If the prob-
ability of the army being able to do this is 1, then it seems
reasonable to say that Jones has degree of blameworthiness 0
for the outcome. On the other hand, it seems unreasonable to
say that the army is certain to be able to install Smith even
if he does not win. We cannot be certain of this outcome,
although it may seem reasonable to give it high probabil-
ity. The higher the probability, the lower Smith’s degree of
blameworthiness.
5 Complexity considerations
Since w
M, ~X=~x,~u can be computed in time polynomial in the
size of M , it easily follows that, given an epistemic state
E = (Pr,K,u), δa,a′,ϕ can be computed in time polynomial
in |K|. Thus, the degree of blameworthiness of an action a
for outcome ϕ can be computed in time polynomial in |K|
and the cardinality of the range of A. Similarly, whether a
is (un)intended in (M,~u) given E can be computed in time
polynomial in |K| and the cardinality of the range of A.
The complexity of determining whether A = a is part
of a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) is Σp2-complete, that is, it is at
the second level of the polynomial hierarchy (Sipser 2012).
This complexity is due to the “there exists–for all” structure
of the problem (there exist sets ~X and ~W of variables such
that for all strict subsets of ~X . . . ). The problem of deter-
mining if ag intended to bring about ~O = ~o has a similar
“there exists–for all” structure; we conjecture that it is also
ΣP2 -complete. While this makes the general problem quite
intractable, in practice, things may not be so bad. Recall that
ag intends to bring about ~O = ~o if there exists a superset
~O′ of ~O (intuitively, all the outcomes that ag intends to af-
fect) with the appropriate properties. In practice, there are
not that many outcomes that determine an agent’s utility. If
we assume that | ~O′| ≤ k for some fixed k, then the prob-
lem becomes polynomial in the number of variables in the
model and the number of actions; moreover, the polynomial
has degree k. In practical applications, it seems reasonable
to assume that there exists a (relatively small) k, making the
problem tractable.
6 Related work
Amazon lists over 50 books in Philosophy, Law, and Psy-
chology with the term “Moral Responsibility” in the ti-
tle, all of which address the types of issues discussed in
this paper. There are dozens of other books on intention.
Moreover, there are AI systems that try to build in notions
of moral responsibility (see, e.g., (Dehghani et al. 2008;
Mao and Gratch 2012; Scheutz, Malle, and Briggs 2015)).
Nevertheless, there has been surprisingly little work on pro-
viding a formal definition of moral responsibility of the type
discussed here. Although other authors have used models
that involve probability and utility (see below), we are not
aware of any formal definition of degree of blameworthi-
ness. We now briefly discuss some of the work most relevant
to this project, without attempting to do a comprehensive
survey of the relevant literature.
As mentioned in the introduction, Chockler and
Halpern (2004) define a notion of responsibility that tries to
capture the diffusion of responsibility when multiple agents
contribute to an outcome but no agent is a but-for cause of
that outcome, that is, no agent can change the outcome by
just switching to a different action. For example, the degree
of responsibility of a voter for the outcome 1/(1+k), where
k is the number of changes needed to make the vote critical
(i.e., a but-for cause). For example, in a 6–5 vote, each of the
6 voters who voted for the outcome has degree of responsi-
bility 1, since they are all critical; if anyone changes her vote,
the outcome will be different. In an 11–0 vote, each voter
has a degree of responsibility of 1/6, because 5 other votes
need to flip to make the vote 6–5, at which point that voter
is critical. Chockler and Halpern also use epistemic states
(although without the utility component): they define a no-
tion of degree of blame given an epistemic state E , which is
the expected degree of responsibility with respect E . These
notions of blame and responsibility do not take utility into
account, nor do they consider potential alternative actions or
intention.
Cohen and Levesque (1990) initiated a great deal of work
in AI on reasoning about an agent goals and intentions. They
define a modal logic that includes operators for goals and be-
liefs, and define formulas INTEND1(ag, a)—agent ag in-
tends action a—and INTEND2(ag, p)—agent ag intends
goal p. INTEND1(ag, a) is the analogue of Definition 4.1,
while INTEND2(ag, p) is the analogue of Definition 4.8;
a goal for Cohen and Levesque is essentially an outcome.
Roughly speaking, agent ag intends to bring about ϕ if ag
has a plan that he believes will bring about ϕ (belief is cap-
tured using a modal operator, but we can think of it as corre-
sponding to “with high probability”), is justified in believing
so, and did not intend to bring out ¬ϕ prior to executing the
plan. (Cohen and Levesque need the latter condition to deal
with examples like Example 4.11.) Their framework does
not allow us to model an agent’s utility, nor can they express
counterfactuals. Part of the reason that Cohen and Levesque
have to work so hard is that they consider plans over time
(and their definition must ensure that ag remains committed
to the plan); another difficulty comes from the fact that they
do not have an easy way to express counterfactuals in their
model.
Van de Poel et al. (2015) focus on what they call the
problem of many hands (a term originally due to Thomp-
son (1980)): that is, the problem of allocating responsibil-
ity to indivdual agents who are members of a group that
is clearly responsible for an outcome. This is essentially
the problem noted in the discussion of overfishing after Ex-
ample 3.5. They consider both prospective and retrospec-
tive notions of responsibility. They formalize some of their
ideas using a variant of the logic CEDL (coalition epis-
temic dynamic logic) (De Lima and Royakkers 2015). Un-
fortunately, CEDL cannot directly capture counterfactuals,
nor can it express quantitative notions like probability. Thus,
while it can express but-for causality, it cannot capture most
of the more subtle examples of causality, such as the Billy-
Suzy rock-throwing example discussed in Section 2, nor can
it capture more quantitative tradeoffs between choices that
arise when defining degree of blameworthiness.
Gaudini, Lorini, and Mayor (2013) discuss moral respon-
sibility for a group, but do not discuss it for a single agent.
It is not obvious how their approach would be applied to
a single-agent setting. They have no causal model, instead
considering a game-theoretic setting where agents are char-
acterized by their guilt-aversion level. It does seem that, with
many agents, game-theoretic concerns should be relevant,
although we believe that a causal model will be needed as
well. It would be of interest to consider an approach that
combines both causality and game theory to analyze moral
responsibility for a group.
Lorini, Longin, and Mayor (2014) use STIT (“seeing to
it that”) logic, which was previously used by Lorini and
Schwarzentruber (2010) to capture causality. The logic in-
cludes operators that can express notions like “group J can
see to it that ϕ will occur, not matter what the agents out-
side J do”. The STIT logic lacks counterfactuals, so it will
have difficulty dealing with some of standard examples in
the causality literature (see (Halpern 2016)). Lorini, Longin,
and Mayor also focus on group notions, such as collective
responsibility.
Barreby, Bourgne, and Ganascia (2015) also provide a
logic for reasoning about moral responsibility based on
the event calculus (Kowalski and Sergot 1986), and show
how it can be implemented using answer set programming
(Gelfond 2008). They show how the trolley problem can be
captured using their approach. Like the STIT approach, their
version of the event calculus cannot express counterfactuals,
so we again do not believe that their approach will be able
to capture adequately the causal issues critical to reasoning
about moral responsibility.
Kleiman-Weiner et al. (2015; 2016) give a definition of
intention in the spirit of that given here. Specifically, it in-
volves counterfactual reasoning and takes expected utility
into account. It gets the same results for intention in the stan-
dard examples as the definition given here, for essentially
the same reasons. However, rather than using causal mod-
els, they use influence diagrams. The agent’s intention when
performing a is then a minimal set of nodes whose fixation
in the influence diagram would result in some action a′ hav-
ing expected utility at least as high as that of a. Kleiman-
Weiner et al. also build on this model to give a theory of
moral permissibility which generalizes the doctrine of dou-
ble effect and integrates both utility maximization and in-
tention (Kleiman-Weiner et al. 2016). Their model is tested
against human judgments across many moral dilemmas.
Vallentyne (2008) sketches a theory of moral responsibil-
ity that involves probability. Specifically, he considers the
probability of each outcome, and how it changes as the re-
sult of an agent’s choice, without using utility and taking ex-
pectation. Thus, he works with tuples of probabilities (one
for each outcome of interest). Rather than using counter-
factuals, he takes A to be a cause of B if performing A
raises the probability of B.7 Thus, an agent is responsible
for an outcome only if his action raises the probability of
that outcome. His model also takes into account the proba-
bility of an agent’s disposition to act. This seems hard to de-
termine. Moreover, while Vallentyne uses disposition as an
input to determining moral responsibility; for autonomous
agents, we would want the agent’s disposition to depend in
part on moral responsibility.
Perhaps closest to this paper is the work of Braham and
van Hees (2012). They say that an agent ag is morally re-
sponsible for an outcome ϕ if (a) his action a was a cause
of ϕ, (b) ag intended to perform a, and (c) ag had no eligi-
ble action a′ with a higher avoidance potential. They define
cause using Wright’s (1988) notion of a NESS test (Neces-
sary Element of a Sufficient Set),8 and do not give a for-
mal definition of intentionality, instead assuming that in sit-
uations of interest to them, it is always satisfied. Roughly
speaking, the avoidance potential of a with respect to ϕ is
the probability that a does not result in ϕ. Thus, the notion
of the avoidance potential of an action a for ϕ being greater
than that of a′ is somewhat related to having δa,a′,ϕ > 0,
although the technical details are quite different. Braham
and van Rees consider a multi-agent setting, where all the
uncertainty is due to uncertainty about what the other agents
will do; they further assume that the outcome is completely
determined given a strategy for each agent (so, in particular,
in the single-agent case, their setting is completely deter-
ministic; they do not allow uncertainty about the outcome).9
Nevertheless, it is clear that their notion of avoidance poten-
tial is trying to compare outcomes of a to those of other acts,
in the spirit of Definition 3.2.
7This approach to causality is known to not deal well with many
examples; see (Halpern 2016).
8See (Halpern 2008) for a discussion of problems with using
the NESS test to define causality.
9Since Braham and van Rees do not make use of any of the ma-
chinery of game theory—in particular, for them, the probabilities
of other agents’ strategies do not necessarily arise from equilibrium
considerations—there is no difficulty in identifying a strategy pro-
file (a description of the strategy used by each of the agents) with a
context, so having a probability on contexts as we have done here is
more general than having a probability on other agents’ strategies.
7 Conclusion
People’s ascriptions of moral responsibility seem to involve
three components that we have called here causality, degree
of blameworthiness, and intention. We have given formal
definitions of the latter two. Because it is not clear exactly
how intention and degree of blame should be combined, we
have left them here as separate components of moral re-
sponsibility.10 Considerations of moral responsibility have
become more pressing as we develop driverless cars, robots
that will help in nursing homes, and software assistants. The
framework presented here should help in that regard.
Our definitions of blameworthiness and intention were
given relative to an epistemic state that included a probabil-
ity measure and a utility function. This means that actions
could be compared in terms of expected utility; this played
a key role in the definitions. But there are some obvious
concerns: first, agents do not “have” complete probability
measures and utility functions. Constructing them requires
nontrivial computational effort. Things get even worse if we
try to consider what the probability and utility of a “reason-
able” person should be; there will clearly be far from com-
plete agreement about what these should be. And even if we
could agree on a probability and utility, it is not clear that
maximizing expected utility is the “right” decision rule. One
direction for further research is to consider how the defini-
tions given here play out if we use, for example, a set of
probability measures rather than a single one, and/or use de-
cision rules other than expected utility maximization (e.g.,
maximin). Another issue that deserves further investigation
is responsibility as a member of the group vs. responsibility
as an individual (see the brief discussion after Example 3.5).
One final comment: the way we have used “blamewor-
thy” in this paper is perhaps closer to the way others might
use the word “responsible”. That is, some people might say
that we should not blame the person who killed one rather
than 5 in the trolley problem, although that person is defi-
nitely responsible for the one death. There is a general prob-
lem in this area that English tends to use a small set of
words (“blame”, “responsibility”, “culpability”) for a com-
plex of closely related notions. People are typically not care-
ful to distinguish which notion they mean. One advantage of
causal models is that they allow us to tease apart various no-
tions, such as what we have called “blameworthiness” here
and the notions of “responsibility” and “blame” as defined
by Chockler and Halpern (2004). There may be other re-
lated notions worth considering. We hope that the particular
words we have chosen to denote these notions does not con-
fuse what we consider the important underlying issues.
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